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This study aims to map the village fund supervision system's pattern 
and detect the possibility of loopholes in the system. It can provide 
recommendations for strategy formulations that can prevent fraud in 
village fund management. This research uses qualitative methods with a 
case study research strategy. The results showed no fraud found in the 
three research objects, but the potential for fraud still exists and can 
change to be fraud due to lack of coordination of supervision between 
related institutions and unsolid whistleblowing system. This paper 
offers to strengthen internal control and whistleblowing system to 
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Tujuan penelitian ini adalah memetakan pola sistem pengawasan dana desa 
dan mendeteksi kemungkinan adanya celah (loopholes) fraud dari sistem 
tersebut sehingga dapat memberikan rekomendasi strategi yang mampu 
mencegah tindakan fraud pada pengelolaan dana desa. Penelitian ini 
menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan pendekatan studi kasus. Hasil 
penelitian menunjukkan bahwa tidak ada fraud yang ditemukan pada tiga objek 
penelitian, tetapi potensi fraud eksis dan bisa mengubah pada kondisi yang 
yang menyebabkan terjadinya fraud akibat belum optimalnya koordinasi 
pengawasan antar lembaga dan belum solidnya sistem whistleblowing yang 
dimplementasikan. Paper ini menawarkan penguatan pengendalian internal 
dan whistleblowing system yang terintegrasi agar permasalahan sistem 
pengawasan dana desa bisa diselesaikan dengan baik. 
  
Kata Kunci : Dana desa; Fraud; Fraud prevention; Fraud detection 
JEL Classification: M420 
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The number of Village Fund rolled out has been supported by comprehensive 
regulations and governance (Kemenkeu, 2017). Many reports show different things 
about the prevalence of village heads involved in the misuse of village funds (village 
fund fraud). Fraud includes various acts against the law (Tuanakotta, 2010),  the 
practice of cheating and often interpreted with irregularities (Priantara, 2013; Reurink, 
2018; Tutino & Merlo, 2019; Van Driel, 2019). The transfer of blame to village heads is 
naive because they also have limitations regarding literacy and understanding of the 
term "corruption" used by anti-corruption practitioners in Indonesia, which 
sociologically refers to officials' abuse for personal gain. This term emerged through 
describing the corruption case of the octopus president Suharto (Tuanakotta, 2010). 
Limited knowledge of how to avoid and comply with a set of rules governing village 
funds management and accountability is one of the problems (IP03; IP04, 2017).  
Support for transparency and good internal control sometimes does not 
guarantee that a program is free from potential fraud. Based on the Village Financial 
Management Study Report: Allocation of Village Funds and Village Funds, the 
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) said there were several problems, 
including the potential for corruption/fraud from the start of the process of 
distributing village funds, both by village officials and assistants due to weaknesses of 
village officials (KPK, 2015b). There are five corruption-prone points in the process of 
managing village funds. These are the planning, management, implementation 
(procurement of goods and services in terms of distribution and management of village 
funds), the process of accountability and monitoring and evaluation) (Indonesia 
Corruption Watch, 2017). In a study conducted in January 2015, the KPK found 14 
findings involving four aspects, namely regulatory and institutional aspects, 
management aspects, aspects of supervision, and human resources aspects  (KPK, 
2015a). 
Law No. 6/2014 mandates layered supervision as a form of security for village 
funds, but based on field research, not all supervision levels work well. The same thing 
was also expressed, "The practice of supervision is currently still minimal, and there is 
no legal umbrella and regulation from the government for the supervisory process." 
The government's supervision regulations are still generally on the performance of the 
village government as a whole. Based on a preliminary study, the BPKP and the 
InspectorateInspectorate's supervision is carried out with a random system in each 
budget year due to limited personnel and lack of understanding of the Village Law and 
its derivatives. 
Another obstacle is the absence of a delegation of authority from the Regent to 
the sub-district. The sub-district is still dominant in only conducting administrative 
supervision due to the delegation of authority and the still limited capacity of each sub-
district. Another government step to strengthen supervision is to sign a memorandum 
of understanding (MoU) with various parties. This step also has pros and cons. 
According to Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) data, there were 110 cases of 
misappropriation of village funds and village fund allocations during 2016-2017. Based 
on the ICW report, since 2015, 215 Village heads have been involved in dealing with 
the law and have been imprisoned for mismanagement of village funds (Indonesia 
Corruption Watch, 2017). 
Researchers conducted a literature review related to research on the prevention 
and detection of village fund corruption since the issuance of Law Number 6 of 2014, 
and related research is still relatively lacking. Researchers find research 
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Anantawikrama, Komang, & Daniel (2019); Atmadja & Saputra, (2017);  and Puspasari, 
(2015). Research of Puspasari (2015) is more of a theoretical study for preventing 
village fund fraud. Atmadja & Saputra (2017) states that apparatus competence and 
internal control systems significantly affect the prevention of fraud in village financial 
management, and morality is proven to moderate the influence of apparatus 
competence and internal control systems on fraud prevention village financial 
management.  
Almost the same thing was also raised by Wijayanti & Hanafi (2018), focusing on 
morality by examining the influence of many variables related to individuals and 
culture on the tendency to commit fraud. Wijayanti & Hanafi (2018) 's main findings 
related to cultivating village government officials' good individual morality to prevent 
fraud. Research by Atmadja & Saputra (2017) stated that an ineffective internal control 
system affects village funds' fraudulent use.  
This study is different from previous research, both by Anantawikrama et al. 
(2019); Puspasari, (2015); Wijayanti & Hanafi (2018). This research looks not only at the 
aspects of prevention but also detection efforts by authorities. This research was 
conducted in more depth by selecting a case study approach using interviewing 
techniques with related informants such as village supervisors, the Finance and 
Development Supervisory Agency, the Village Empowerment Service, the 
Inspectorate, and the village from village government officials and the village 
community. This research's main objective was to find a strategy to prevent and reduce 
fraud in village fund management. It is hoped that the results of this analysis can be 
used to formulate a fraud prevention strategy in channeling village funds to close the 
gap for fraud. 
This research is based on Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht, & Zimbelman (2015); 
Petraşcu & Tieanu, (2014); Repousis, Lois, & Veli (2019) states that fraud can be 
prevented by creating a culture of honesty, openness, and eliminating fraud 
opportunity. Prevention can also be done by instilling fraud awareness (Palupi & 
Santoso, 2017) and internal control (Palupi & Santoso, 2017; Taufik, 2019; Tuanakotta, 
2010). In this case, Tuanakotta (2010) divides internal control into two parts, namely 
active internal control and second passive internal control. On the detection side, 
according to Albrecht et al. (2015), one way to detect fraud is to recognize the 
symptoms of fraud or red flags. Red flagging is an early warning system that has been 
used by auditors to determine the probability of financial statement fraud (Brazel, 
Jones, Thayer, & Warne, 2015). 
Dal Magro & da Cunha (2017) argues that detecting red flags is important to 
detect fraud. This can be seen from assessing the important role of the internal auditor 
in assessing the risk of fraud through red flags that refer to operational activities and 
internal control procedures. Besides, it is suggested that internal auditors be impartial 
about the relevance of their perception that most of the potential fraud arises from red 
flags (Dal Magro & da Cunha, 2017). Another study states that it is important to 
prevent fraud because detection is only needed if fraud prevention fails (Gupta & 
Singh Gill, 2012).  
 
METHOD 
This research is qualitative research with a case study approach. Mahmudi (2003) 
mentions case studies as strategic research to develop public sector accounting. The 
case study approach was chosen because it is very suitable for studying local specific 
phenomena (local contingencies) that have implications for specific policies rather than 
generalities (Yin, 2015). The research was conducted in Barito Kuala Regency with 
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three villages in Alalak District as critical informants for in-depth studies. The three 
villages were selected to represent three of the 5 (status) villages in Barito Kuala 
Regency, especially Alalak District. The villages selected for this research were 
represented in village categories: very underdeveloped, left behind, and developing 
according to the village category assigned by the developing village index (IDM). This 
research was preceded by permission from related parties, and for mutual convenience 
during the data mining process, the chosen villages were deliberately nominated, 
along with the village table, which was the study's object. 
 
Table 1. Research Villages 
No Province District Sub-district Village Code 
1. South Borneo  Barito Kuala A OD01 
2. South Borneo Barito Kuala A OD02 
3. South Borneo Barito Kuala A OD03 
Source: Ministry of Village (2019) 
 
In addition to the nominated research villages, for informants, the researcher also 
codified the informants with the following details: 
 
Table 2. Informant Table or Key Informants 
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This study's data collection was carried out from August 2017 to May 2018, 
including preliminary research, observation, interviews with village informants, and 
the BPKP Village Supervisory Apparatus. Then it continued with focus group 
discussions with other informants. The data collection procedure was carried out using 
field research notes (field logs). Sources of evidence are documents, recordings, 

















Figure 1. Research Process 
Source: Developed from Yin (2015) 
Data Collection: (1) Observation, 
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According to Yin (2015), data analysis consists of testing, categorizing, tabulating, 
and combining evidence to refer to the initial proposition (in this study using research 
questions implied in the introduction) of a study. According to Yin (2015), there are 
five analysis techniques for the case study approach: pattern matching, explanatory 
building, time-series analysis, logic models, and cross-case synthesis. This study uses 
pattern matching to generate predictive patterns of symptoms that occur. 
Pattern matching always involves an attempt to connect two patterns in which 
one is a theoretical pattern, and the other is an observed or operational pattern (Yin, 
2015). In this study, pattern matching techniques compare patterns based on empirical 
data (field data) with existing patterns in theory and regulation (or with some 
alternative predictions). 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Distribution of Village Funds and Accompanying Impact 
The pattern of distributing village funds from 2015 to 2018 has always changed. 
Changes followed changes in distribution patterns in the conditions for channeling 
village funds. The disbursement in 2015 was not based on the performance of the 
distribution or use of village funds in the previous stage, and after 2016 it was required 
based on the previous year performance. Distribution in 2015 is carried out on 
conditions, including reports on realization and followed by reports on usage of the 
previous semester (ID02, 2018). This distribution requirement also applies in the 
following year. In 2018, a difference can be seen: the realization report requirement, 
which is a control over the management of village funds, is removed. Based on the 
explanation made by officials in the PMD Office of Barito Kuala Regency (2018): 
"The distribution of village funds for phase I was carried out on January 29, 2018 
with a total of 190 villages of Rp25.903.854.460 (97,45%) while for phase II it was 
carried out on March 29, 2018 with a total of 160 villages of Rp43.619.116.120 
(82,05%)."(IK03, 2018) 
 
The amount of Village Funds disbursed at the initial stage in Barito Kuala 
Regency reached 100% in the first stage due to the unconditional disbursement process 
as in the previous year's process. Changes in disbursement patterns in 2018 created the 
potential for fraud due to lax conditions. This change is indeed the result of evaluating 
the low absorption performance in the previous year, which was not maximized. The 
excess budget calculation  (SiLPA) was in the Village Cash Account (RKD) (ID02, 2018). 
The choice not to carry out development converted the Village Fund into SiLPA in the 
village treasury. Disbursements that began in August were delayed due to 
administrative constraints. 
Some conditions made village governments choose to make the Village Fund, 
which was distributed in stage II of 2017 in one of the villages, OD01 Village, the focus 
of this research. This was conveyed by one of the village officials in an interview on 
June 7, 2018: 
"Like 2017, there were several projects that were not implemented, because the 
budget had only been released in December so that it was not possible to 
implement them so that they were made into SiLPA, this was conveyed to 
BPD."(ID02, 2018) 




YULIASTINA, M., HUDAYA, M. & NOR, W. 





Village Funds: Bringing Prosperity or Poverty? 
Recently, the welfare of village officials has become a central issue. Village 
officials’ opinions are that the compensation they received was still minimal. This 
could be the cause of the desire to commit fraud, as conveyed by one of the Village 
Officials in Barito Kuala Regency during an interview on May 15, 2018: 
"It is necessary to improve the welfare of village officials so that they are not 
tempted to commit fraud." (ID02, 2018) 
 
a similar statement was conveyed by participants of the FGD Study of the 
Utilization of Village Funds in South Kalimantan on April 29, 2018: 
"Compensation for village officials is very minimal. Village funds should not only 
benefit the village but also for village officials, so that the benefits must be 
expanded. The biggest benefit of village funds for village officials is dealing with 
Law Enforcement Officials (APH) (energy is drained, as expert witnesses)." (IK05, 
2018) 
 
The potential for fraud in the village fund originates from the budget, as seen in 
the description of cases in several villages in Barito Kuala Regency. Incomplete and 
unsupervised budget planning results in the implementation of activities that are not 
optimal and impact the residual use of the budget (SiLPA). The resulting impacts give 
rise to potential fraud in the Village Fund. A transparent, participatory, and 
accountable budget management is the solution to the main problems of corruption 
cases that occur in the village. Budget management is essential to managing the Village 
Fund for issuing reliable reports, so special attention is needed. 
Detailed data from corruption cases regarding the modes and perpetrators 
cannot be explored more deeply. In general, the potential for fraud occurs among 
village heads and PPE, while the standard model is also found in Indonesia. This is 
based on research reports from Indonesia Corruption Watch (2018): 
"Cases of fraud in village funds are generally administrative misappropriation, 
embezzlement, budget abuse, abuse of authority, illegal fees, budget inflation, 
fictitious reports, budget cuts, and bribery. " (Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2018) 
 
The data should be accessible to the public. 
 
Village Funds: Tiered Guidance and Supervision 
Government Regulation Number 43 of 2014 concerning implementing 
regulations for Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages Article 127 point J states 
that monitoring of Village Government administration and village development are to 
be carried out in a participatory manner by the village community (JDIH Ministry of 
Finance, 2017). Figure 2 illustrates the supervision that occurs in village funds. 
Supervision operations by the district/city government are the responsibility of 
the Regent / Mayor. The supervisory function is delegated to the head of the sub-
district and the District / City Inspectorate by the Regent/city. The results of regent / 
municipal government supervision are provided to the central government on the 
subject of the supervision. The government also provides regulations for supervision 
carried out by BPD. BPD is a representation of society. BPD and the community are 
people who are directly involved in villages in terms of village development. They are 
obliged to supervise the management of the Village Fund. 
The government's desire for comprehensive and adequate regulation is shown by 
accommodating appropriate regulations from central to regional levels. The Expert 
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Auditor made this statement of the Barito Regency Inspectorate during an interview on 
June 4, 2018: 
"Supervisory regulations are sufficient and are added to the MoU by the 
government which is considered positive (IK02, 2018)" 
 
Figure 2. Tiered Supervision of Village Funds: Patterns and Reality 
 
Several sources stated that regulations are still general, so the capacity of 
supervision becomes an obstacle to the implementation of supervision (IK02, 2018; 
IK03, 2018). At the district level in Barito Kuala, the agency that carries out supervision 
has undoubted capacity. It is just that the supervisory personnel are limited, and their 
scope of supervision is also broad, not only in the village. Supervision at the sub-
district level is constrained by capacity and personnel, and there is no devolution of 
authority. Capacity building and affirmation of the delegation of authority from the 
Regent to the District are needed to optimize supervision because the sub-district has 
close contact with the village. This also applies to the BPD level as an extension of the 
community. 
 
Forms of Fraud Prevention and Village Fund Detection Pursued by The Government 
Based on the research results in the field of BPKP and the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, the Inspectorate, PMD, and BPD have each prepared preventive and detection 
steps. Research conducted in the field and compared with the theory of fraud 
prevention efforts by WS Albrecht et al. (2012) is shown in Table 3. 
Fraud detection has also been carried out by the supervisory agency, although it 
is not optimal. Table 4 shows the forms of detection efforts carried out compared to the 
theory of fraud detection by WS Albrecht et al. (2012). 
Most theories based on Fraud Prevention and Detection have been implemented, 
but in practice, they cannot be part of prevention and detection ultimately. Formal 
supervisory agencies in South Kalimantan collaborate to carry out escorts, such as this 
statement from the BPKP Village Apparatus, the South Kalimantan Representative, 
from an interview on August 23, 2017: 
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"Together with the Inspectorate, Heads of related Services and Village Officials, 
BPKP created a WAG (WhatsApp Group) to facilitate the coordination process." 
(IP03; IP04, 2017) 
 
Table 3. Fraud Prevention Efforts Implemented 





1. Good internal 
control 
Yes - Siskuedes (IP03; 
IP04, 2017) 





- Not  
3. Supervise and 
provide a hotline 
(whistleblowing 
system) 
Yes - Hotline at the 
village ministry 
(IK01, 2018; IK03, 
2018; IP03; IP04, 
2017) 
4. Create a system of 
sanctions 
Yes - (Law No.6, 2014) 
(IK03, 2018) 
5. Conduct proactive 
audits 
Yes - Special 
Examination 
(IK03, 2018)  
 
Table 4. Fraud Detection Efforts Carried Out 





1. Identify possible fraud  Yes - Special Examination 
(IK03, 2018) 
2. Map possible fraud 
symptoms (red flag) 
- Not (IK03, 2018) 
 
The collaboration carried out by BPKP, and cooperating institutions started with 
central and regional levels as the first step to guarding village funds. In 2017 BPKP 
collaborated with the Ministry of Home Affairs to develop and launch the Village 
Financial System (SISKEUDES). 
SISKEUDES is used nationally. Previously Barito Kuala District used the 
Simpekdes application, which was developed independently. This is different from 
SISKEUDES, which was created by the BPKP and the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
SISKEUDES produces reports by established regulations and mechanisms to allow the 
government to assist village officials in preparing village financial reports that are 
more transparent and accountable. The government claims SISKEUDES is a form of 
potential Village Fund fraud prevention and suppression. SISKUEDES was also 
mentioned as part of the Implementation of Internal Control, but several sources stated 
that SISKEUDES could not play a role in Internal Control. 
The government has created complaints channels through the village task force. 
There is a hotline (1500040) and a website (https://satgas.kemendesa.go.id/). As of 
early 2019, the website was not accessible. In reality, most remote areas cannot access 
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these complaints channels, and networking and education are only provided for a few 
parties. 
The supervision at each level of control is still not optimal because there is no 
coordination between supervisory agencies for the follow-up process. The government 
has drafted regulations on the sanctions system, but several parties have seen its 
implementation as obstructing the village development process. According to a source 
in the Inspectorate of Barito Kuala Regency, periodic audits are not effective because 
they still use a sampling system. The detection process is carried out by identifying the 
possibility of fraud through a special audit, which is only conducted when there are 
reports of potential fraud. 
 
Potential Fraud Opportunity Patterns in the Research Subject 
For the supervisory agency to function optimally in its role in preventing and 
detecting fraud, staff need to understand fraud and the types of fraud that may occur. 
The results show that fraud was not found in the three research villages, namely 
Beranggas Timur Village, Pulau Sugara Village, and Tanjung Harapan Village, but the 
potential for fraud in the Village Fund might occur. During the research process, there 
was the potential for fraud. Based on studies, plus observations and interviews 
conducted by researchers, several identifiable conditions could trigger potential fraud. 
According to the hexagon fraud theory, these are based on the detection of fraud that 
cannot be separated from stimulus, ability, opportunity, rationalization, ego, and 
collusion. It is a refinement of previous fraud theories. Table 5 maps potential fraud 
that may occur in the research village. 
Conclusions based on the results of mapping conditions and potential fraud in 
the research village include existing conditions that caused potential fraud in the 
village. The consistency is a high political cost because the village head holds total 
power, regulations are wrongly interpreted, village officials' knowledge of financial 
management is lacking, and conflicts between communities and the village 
government exist. These findings are in line with the statement (Indonesia Corruption 
Watch, 2018). Other conditions were the lack of the BPD's and the community's 
supervisory role and the lack of compensation received by APD. PPE not receiving 
direct benefits from DD also prevented the potential for fraud. According to 
Tuanakotta (2010) and Indonesia Corruption Watch (2018), the potential for a situation 
being prone to this happening depends on budget abuse/inflation, embezzlement, 
mark-ups, fictional reports, fictional projects, and abuse of power. The minimal 
supervisory roles of the BPD and the community, and the minimal compensation 
received by the PPE, means the PPE does not receive direct benefit from DD, creating 
an immense potential for fraud. This leads directly to budget abuse/inflation, 
embezzlement, and mark-ups. This potential was found in three villages in this 
research. 
The potential for fraud that often occurs is related to budget abuse, 
embezzlement, fictitious reports, fictitious activities/projects, and budget inflation. 
Therefore, prevention and detection are recommended. The recommendations for 
prevention strategies that can be implemented include strengthening internal control. 
Active and passive control based on Tuanakotta (2010) Launching data in fraud cases 
should be used to map it and its causes and implement sanctions due to fraud 
regularly. This is part of internal control and will provide a deterrent (Tuanakotta, 
2010). Strengthening and improving internal control can be achieved by maximizing 
the use of SISKEUDES, which is claimed to be the government's internal control 
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system. Compensation received by the village apparatus must be increased. Periodic 
audits conducted by the Inspectorate and BPKP must be done to make the Village 
Government the subject of overall inspection without sampling. Teringrasi reporting 
channels should be used as a form of internal control. 
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Stable Mechanisms and Channels for Responding to and Reporting Fraud 
The registered reporting channel is the final recommendation given in this paper 
for the early detection of fraud. A reporting channel can be created using an integrated 
whistleblower system. This system involves all parties known as a supra village, 
namely the PMD Office, the Inspectorate for the Regency, District, BPD, and 
community levels. Those at mid-level who have established their hotlines through the 
village task force can work together with the system. Figure 3 illustrates a 
recommendation for an integrated complaints channel mechanism. 
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Figure 3. Recommendations for the Whistleblowing System Mechanism at the 
Village Level 
 
An integrated reporting channel is established at the level closest to the village so 
that complaints handling can be acted upon more quickly. The process is simplified by 
setting up a complaints hotline. This process starts when a whistleblower (referred to 
as a reporter) identifies a violation / potential fraud and makes a report. Reports can 
be submitted online via the call center or in person. The report is processed by the 
verification team using the evidence submitted by the reporter. The next step will be a 
field assessment and cross-check of the report. The field team's cross-check determines 
whether the report is forwarded to the supervisory agency or just filed if it is not 
found. The final step is taken by APH on the audit institution's recommendation if 
there is a violation of the law. 
A district can function as a call center and complaints office, based on the law 
mandate on the delegation of supervisory authority to the district head. Proximity to 
the village is also another balance; BPD and village assistants act as an initial 
verification team for the evidence submitted, which can then be followed up by the 
Village Community Empowerment Service (PMD). The field team can verify facts 
about the incident. The supervisory agency comprises the Inspectorate, the Financial 
and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP), and the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) according to their capabilities. Cooperation between institutions is 
needed because all supervisory agencies play a role determined by their respective 
capabilities. 
This system requires commitment and cooperation from various parties, 
especially the public, who are actively involved as reporters. Applicable regulations in 
Indonesia must protect whistleblowers. If a whistleblower makes a report, it is 
necessary to receive appropriate treatment, including guarantees of retaliation 
protection. Whistleblower reports also need to be protected and followed up by a 
specially formed team. Protecting witnesses and victims in Indonesia is based on Law 
No.13 of 2006, which concerns the protection of witnesses and victims (Lembaga 
Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban, 2011). 
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The Indonesian government has built a village fund supervision system 
involving various institutions and levels of supervision, but there has been no excellent 
coordination among the agencies involved in practice. The Village Consultative 
Assembly (BPD), for example, has yet to prove its abilities regarding overseeing village 
funds. Before the Village Fund report is submitted to the District, the report is 
submitted and reviewed by the BPD management periodically from a supervisory 
perspective. Besides, the whistleblowing system mechanism is also not yet fully 
functioning. This is because there is no reliable coordination among related 
institutions, and the whistleblowing system has not been integrated from the village 
level to the central government. 
Regulations and mechanisms that act as fraud prevention and detection have not 
been adequately implemented in the three researched villages. This is also the case in 
villages in Barito Kuala District. Regulations made by the government have not been 
implemented optimally, some are still overlapping, and ambiguity can cause fraud. 
The most common instances involve budget abuse, embezzlement, and mark-ups. 
Another researcher should use the matching pattern results in Table 4 as a variable to 
test the relationship of each of these patterns with efforts to prevent and detect fraud in 
village funds. 
This research has been carried out by ethical considerations of research and 
scientific procedures, but there were limitations. The problem of fraud in village funds 
is a crucial and sensitive issue. It is not uncommon for the informants who speak to the 
researcher to choose a cautious attitude in providing their information, so the 
researchers' information may not be accurate. To solve this problem, the researcher 
used the triangulation method, where the data obtained from the informants were 
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